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USING GENDER AS A BASIS OF
CLIENT SELECTION:
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
JOAN MAHONEY*

INTRODUCTION

Judith Nathanson is a lawyer in private practice. She has made
a decision to represent only women in divorce cases, although she
represents men in other matters. After seeking her services and
being refused because of his gender, Joseph Stropnicky filed a com
plaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
("MCAD").1 Following a hearing, the MCAD found Ms. Nathan
son liable on the grounds that her practice is discriminatory.
There is no question that Ms. Nathanson discriminated, in that
. she chose her clientele based on gender. The question before the
MCAD, and being discussed in this Symposium, is whether that
particular form of discrimination is, or ought to be, unlawful. Most
of us discriminate, one way or another, several times a week, at
least. We decide which individuals to invite to a party, which col
leagues with whom we will have lunch, which doctor or carpenter or
shoemaker to patronize. All of these are discriminatory acts, in
that we are choosing to associate or do business with one person or
several persons, instead of others. But most of them are not unlaw
fully discriminatory acts, either because the basis of the discrimina
tion is permissible (this shoemaker does better work than the other,
for example), or because the circumstances are simply not covered
by law. Even if I deliberately choose to invite no people of color, or
only people of color, to a party at my house, unless my house has
become a place of public accommodation (and thus within the

* Professor, Western New England College School of Law. A.B., 1964, Univer
sity of Chicago; A.M., 1967, University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, Wayne State University;
Ph.D., 1989, Cambridge University. I would like to thank Nancy Levit for her willing
ness to discuss the ideas in this essay, as well as her editorial assistance. Any mistakes
in interpretation are, of course, mine alone.
1. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25,
1997).
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scope of state law2 or Title IP) or unless I am acting under color of
state law (and thus within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment4
and Section 19835 ), those choices are not legally redressable.
Many issues relating to the practice of law raise concerns about
treating a law office as a place of public accommodation and thus
subject to the statute. In addition, a First Amendment defense
could be offered regarding a lawyer's choice of clients. But those
are concerns I leave to my colleagues. Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the Massachusetts statute applies to this situation, a
significant issue still exists: whether the choice of clientele by Ms.
Nathanson ought to be treated as unlawful discrimination. In mak
ing that determination, one could approach the situation positively
or normatively. That is, one could ask whether, under the current
understanding of the law of discrimination, as defined largely by the
United States Supreme Court, Ms. Nathanson's policy is illegal. Or,
taking a normative approach, one could ask whether, looking at
various feminist approaches to the law, her practices should be
illegal.
I.
A.

THE LAW REGARDING DISCRIMINATION

The Standard for Gender Discrimination

Just as in the early race cases, in the late 19th century, in which
the Supreme Court upheld the concept of separate spheres for dif
ferent races,6 the early cases also approved of separate spheres for
men and women, as in Bradwell v. Illinois,7 which upheld the exclu
sion of women from the practice of law. Beginning in the early
1970's, however, the Supreme Court reversed course and began to
strike down laws that discriminated on the basis of sex.s Unlike the
race cases, however, in which the Court quickly settled on a stan
2. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1996); see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. II, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1994).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. See 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994).
6. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
8. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down a Louisiana
law that excluded women from jury service); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (rejecting a federal law that made it easier for a serviceman to claim his wife as a
dependent than it was for a similarly situated woman to claim her husband as a depen
dent); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law giving men a
preference over women in the administration of intestate estates).
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dard of review,9 it took some time before the Court established the
appropriate standard in gender cases,t° finally resolving the issue in
Craig v. Boren,u in which the Court held that, "[t]o withstand con
stitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to ... those objectives."12
The level of review described in Craig is usually referred to as
intermediate scrutiny. It is neither as difficult for the government
to defend its actions as is strict scrutiny, used in cases dealing with
race, nor as difficult for the plaintiff to argue as is the rational basis
test. 13 Instead, each case involving gender discrimination tends to
be fairly fact specific, and has been used both to uphold laws that
discriminate on the basis of gender,14 and to strike them down.1 5 In
some ways gender cases are different from those involving other
groups that have suffered discrimination. Despite a long history of
exclusion from public life and from equal participation in the eco
nomic life of the country, many statutes and government practices
were passed to protect women, and cases involving gender discrimi
nation are as often brought by men as by women. 16 One of the
factors that the Court has looked at in these cases is the issue of
whether the statute or practice in question has been one that per
petuated stereotypes of gender roles. 17
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine
of separate but equal); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
Japanese exclusion but applying strict scrutiny).
10. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691-92 (disagreeing on whether the Court
should use strict scrutiny or some lesser, but still heightened, standard of review).
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
12. Id. at 197.
13. The rational basis test is used when the group in question has not been de
fined as discrete and insular, as described in the famous footnote 4 in United States v.
Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and when the right involved has
not been defined as fundamental, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
15. Most recently, the Court rejected the exclusion of women from the Virginia
Military Institute, a public school. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
16. In Craig, for example, the challenged statute allowed women to purchase beer
at the age of eighteen, while men were not allowed to purchase beer until the age of
twenty-one. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92; see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (striking down the exclusion of men from a nursing
program at a state school); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (1981) ("[T]his Court has con
sistently upheld statutes where the gender classification ... realistically reflects the fact
that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.").
17. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down an Alabama statute
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Affirmative Action

Because traditionally state practices have discriminated both
against and in favor of women, it makes the determination of
whether a statute is intended as remedial, and therefore more likely
to be upheld, more difficult. Nonetheless, the Court has been will
ing to uphold gender classifications that benefit women when they
are designed to remedy past discrimination. 18 Most of the chal
lenges to affirmative action programs have been in cases involving
race. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,19 the Supreme Court
held that the standard that applies when practices or statutes disfa
vor a racial or ethnic group that has been the subject of discrimina
tion also applies when statutes or practices are designed to benefit a
previously disadvantaged group.20 In other words, it is not discrimi
nation against a racial or ethnic minority that triggers strict scrutiny,
but the use of racial or ethnic classifications for whatever purpose.
As the Court held in Adarand, "federal racial classifications, like
those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest,
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."21 What the
Court has not yet made clear is what arguments the government
could make to meet the standard, although there is clearly a split on
that issue. 22
If, therefore, the Court were to apply the same symmetry in
gender cases that it does currently in race cases, the test for reme
dial actions, those designed to remedy past discrimination, would
be mid-level scrutiny, just as it is used to determine whether an ac
tion discriminates against women.' In other words, it should be eas
ier to persuade the Court to uphold affirmative action programs
aimed at women than those aimed at racial or ethnic groups. The
analysis is not completely apposite, of course, because Ms. Nathan
son's acts were private, and therefore were not covered by the Conthat allowed the award of alimony to women but not men, on the ground that it perpet
uated the stereotype that men supported their wives and that wives were always eco
nomically dependent on their husbands but not the other way around).
18. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a provision of
the Social Security Act that calculated benefits in a way that was more advantageous to
women).
19. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
20. See id. at 227-29.
21. Id. at 235 (citation omitted).
22. Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Adarand stated that strict scru
tiny was not necessarily fatal in fact, id., while Justice Scalia took the position that the
Government could never use racial classifications to remedy past discrimination, id. at
236 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment).
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stitution in any event. On the other hand, the Court by and large
has applied the same standards in constitutional cases and acts of
private discrimination, or affirmative action, that were covered by
federallaw. 23 If, therefore, Ms. Nathanson were to argue that the
statute ought not to apply, because her restricted practice was in
fact an act of affirmative action, meant to redress discrimination
against women, she might have a good claim.

C.

The Standard as Applied

In the constitutional claim, the test in a mid-level scrutiny case
is whether the state can show that the classification in question
serves an important government objective, and whether the classifi
cation is substantially related to that objective. 24 Translating that
test into the private context, the question would be whether Ms.
Nathanson can show an important objective that is substantially re
lated to the discrimination she engages in. Based on the evidence
concerning the results of divorce on the status of women,2s and the
fact that over the years she herself has found that women's exper
iences and roles during marriage make it necessary to make differ
ent arguments at the time of divorce, it would appear that she can
meet that test.
The most relevant recent case appears to be Mississippi Uni
versity for Women v. Hogan,26 in which the Supreme Court ruled
that restricting a nursing program at a state school that had been
established solely for women violated the constitutional rights of a
male applicant to the program.27 The basis for the decision was the
rejection of the state's claim that the restriction was an affirmative
action measure. Instead, the Court found that the exclusion was
23. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978)
(holding that the case could be determined under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
although since the University of California is a state institution, the Fourteenth Amend
ment was also applicable); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987) (upholding gender based affirmative action program under Title VII, based both
on statutory and Constitutional precedent).
24. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
25. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985). Although
Weitzman's methodology has been criticized, see, e.g., Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J.
Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641
(1988), most studies support her basic conclusion, that women suffer economically as a
result of divorce, see, e.g., James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic
Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352 (1987); Heather R.
Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986).
26. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
27. See id. at 730.
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not necessary to compensate for past discrimination;28 and, indeed,
the exclusion itself perpetuated stereotypes about the role of wo
men. 29 Finally, it was clear that the exclusion significantly disad
vantaged Hogan and would have required him to attend a program
at a considerable distance from where he lived and worked. 3D
The circumstances of this case are very different. There is no
evidence that Mr. Stropnicky was unable to secure a lawyer to rep
resent him. Apparently, when Ms. Nathanson declined his case, he
did not seek another attorney and executed the divorce agreement
without having it reviewed. 31 Furthermore, although women have
traditionally found attorneys to represent them in divorce cases, if,
in fact, women are economically disadvantaged as a result of di
vorce, there is a good argument to be made that they need special
ized services from someone committed to the specific issues that
arise in their regard. Rather than perpetuating stereotypes, such
representation simply treats women as unique and treats their con
tributions to marriage as meaningful.32
II.

NORMATIVE STANDARDS: THE FEMINIST ApPROACH

Again, assuming that the law should apply at all, most feminists
presumably would object to the practice of a lawyer who restricted
his or her clientele to men, just as we would be offended by a law
yer who refused to represent people of color. But one of the ques
tions this case raises is the issue of what we might call parity in
antidiscrimination law, otherwise known as the test of whether
what's good for the goose is good for the gander.
Virtually no one believes in absolute parity; that is, that women
should always be treated precisely the same as men and that people
of color should always be treated precisely the same as whites. At a
minimum, when acts of discrimination by government or industry
have been demonstrated, remedial action to redress that wrong,
even if it temporarily gives an advantage to employees or job appli
28. See id. at 727-28.
29. See id. at 729-30.
30. See id. at 723-24 & 23 n.8.
31. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MeAD
Feb. 25, 1997).
32. An argument can be made that because Mr. Stropnicky allegedly had main
tained an untraditional role in his marriage, more like the traditional position that wo
men have generally held, Ms. Nathanson could have represented him consistently with
her goals. If, nonetheless, she believes that even men who occupy traditional female
roles do better at the time of divorce or at reentering the job market, her original posi
tion is not inconsistent.
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cants of color is acceptable even to the most conservative members
of the Supreme Court. 33 Many people would go further than that
and allow remedial action to achieve a more integrated work place
or educational institution even without a showing of past pur
poseful discrimination. 34
On the other hand, many people, including some feminists,
would take the position that other than redressing past discrimina
tion, or imbalances in the representation of women and people of
color in institutions, everyone should be treated as similarly as pos
sible. That position almost certainly would support the finding of
the MCAD, that Ms. Nathanson was engaging in impermissible dis
crimination when she restricted her divorce practice to women, un
less, perhaps, she could show that women had a more difficult time
securing representation, in which case her position might be defined
as remedial.
Many feminists would, however, disagree with the decision of
the MCAD. The issue is not whether women have been unable to
secure representation, but whether Ms. Nathanson believes women
have different needs in divorce cases, that they need a particular
kind of representation, which she is more capable of providing, or
even simply more interested in providing. Some lawyers, for exam
ple, only represent plaintiffs in tort cases, while others are more
comfortable representing defendants. Most labor lawyers represent
either unions or employers, but rarely represent both. In the crimi
nallaw field, one either acts as a criminal defense lawyer or a prose
cutor, but rarely in both capacities at the same time. The difference
here, of course, is that sex discrimination is prohibited by law,
whereas refusing to act for a cigarette company is not. But maybe
the two situations have more in common than it would initially
appear.
A.

The Equal Treatment Approach

Although it is always risky to generalize, and feminist legal the
ory has mUltiplied in recent years and ventured into wide-ranging
analyses of the law,35 it is possible to divide feminist jurisprudence
33. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, I.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
34. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
35. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 COR
NELL L. REv. 575 (1993); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Rea
sonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992);
Martha Albertson Fmeman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 653 (1992).
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into roughly three different categories. Probably the first group,
historically, consists of what are usually called equal treatment fem
inists, or those who take the position that as much as possible the
law should treat men and women the same. 36 Wendy Williams, one
of the leading proponents of this position, has argued that women
should reject laws that provide special benefits for pregnancy just as
they would object to those that discriminate against pregnancy. She
argues that
the same doctrinal approach that permits pregnancy to be treated
worse than other disabilities is the same one that will allow the
state constitutional freedom to create special benefits for preg
nant women. . .. If we can't have it both ways, we need to think
carefully about which way we want to have it. 37

Using that approach, it would appear necessary to agree with
the findings of the MeAD concerning Ms. Nathanson's restricted
practice. Unless an argument can be made that women are unable
to find representation in divorce cases, the fact that Ms. Nathanson
believes that women have unique arguments to make, ones that she
is either better prepared or more inclined to make, is irrelevant if
one is firmly committed to the equal treatment model. A male at
torney could just as easily claim, for example, that men are disfa
vored in custody arrangements, that he is better prepared or more
inclined to make the arguments on their behalf, and that he is
therefore permitted to restrict his practice to men. In other words,
the equality model feminists are fairly likely to accept the parity
argument.
B.

Radical Feminist Thought

On the other hand, the radical feminist school of jurispru
dence, often referred to as the antisubordination model,38 is most
likely to reject the parity argument. Whereas the equality model
36. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984)
[hereinafter Williams, Equality's Riddle]; Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 175 (1982)
[hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis]; Nadine Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1686 (1980). For a discussion of this and other schools of feminist legal thought,
see Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).
37. Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 36, at 196.
38. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986); Ann Scales,
The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
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sees women as having been treated dissimilarly from men legally,
with a goal of similar treatment, or sameness, the antisubordination
model sees women as not the same, but rather as different as a re
sult of a history of oppression. Catharine MacKinnon has written:
Inequality because of sex defines and situates women as women.
If the sexes were equal, women would not be sexually subjected.
Sexual force would be exceptional, consent to sex could be com
monly real, and sexually violated women would be believed. If
the sexes were equal, women would not be economically sub
jected, their desperation and marginality cultivated, their en
forced dependency exploited sexually or economically.39

The purpose of legal reform, then, for radical feminists, is to
restructure law so as to end the oppression of women, rather than
attempting to achieve sameness in the eyes of the law. An actual
example of the differences between these approaches can be seen in
the debate about maternity leave. California Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Guerra 40 was a case challenging a California
statute that provided maternity leave for women but no comparable
leave for men.41 Feminists were sharply split on this issue and filed
amicus briefs on both sides. Equal treatment feminists argued that
the statute violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and also took the position
that as a matter of policy, feminists should reject special accommo
dations for women that were not similarly offered to men.42 On the
other hand, antisubordination feminists took the position that real
istically women bear the burden of not only pregnancy and child
birth, but the bulk of the care for newborns, and that any
government action that offers them protection ought not to be
rejected. 43
Antisubordination feminists presumably would have no
trouble justifying Ms. Nathanson's position, whether it was formally
described as an attempt at affirmative action or not. Using the ar
39. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
215 (1989).
40. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
41. The more recent United States Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c.
§ 2601 (1993), mandating a period of unpaid leave for new parents, whether by birth or
adoption, and employees needing to care· for sick children or elderly parents, is gender
neutral, as opposed to the earlier California statute.
42. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 36, at 351-70.
43. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy:
Equal Treatment, Positive Action, and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1983) (controversy concerning a Montana statute).
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gument that women are usually in a worse economic position after
a divorce than they were during the marriage,44 if a woman attorney
chooses to use her energy to represent women instead of men, she
should be allowed to do that, as her way of redressing what is in any
event an inequitable situation.
C.

Cultural Feminism

Although some overlap exists between all the approaches, a
third type of feminist legal analysis, is usually referred to as cultural
or different voice feminism. 45 Much of the work in this area has
been done as an analysis of the different way women would ap
proach law and the legal system, as opposed to a specific critique of
a statute or particular area of law, as the two schools discussed
above are more likely to do. 46
Cultural feminists tend to look at the ways in which women are
different, not presumably because of some reliance on genetics or
physical characteristics, although the ability to bear children is cer
tainly a physical difference that is reflected in women's approach to
any number of issues, including those of law. The emphasis, how
ever, is on the difference in women's experiences, within our cul
ture, and how, as a result of those experiences, women look at legal
issues and legal systems in ways that are, by and large, different
from the ways that men qo. Robin West has written:
Women are actually or potentially materially connected to other
human life. Men aren't. This material fact has existential conse
quences. While it may be true for men that the individual is
"epistemologically and morally prior to the collectivity," it is not
true for women. The potential for material connection with the
other defines women's subjective, phenomenological and existen
tial state, just as surely as the inevitability of material separation
from the other defines men's existential state. Our potential for
material connection engenders pleasures and pains, values and
dangers, and attractions and fears, which are entirely different
from those which follow, for men, from the necessity of
44.
45.

See
See

WEITZMAN,

supra note 25, at 323.

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (illustrating differences between the way young
men and women think); see also Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
46. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 3 (1988); Mary Joe Frug, Re·Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985).
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separation. 47

Rather than looking at whether women have achieved formal
equality within the legal system regarding the divorce process, or
whether the results of divorce tend to continue the oppression of
women, cultural feminists would be more likely to look at the way
women experience divorce within the legal system. If, to oversim
plify Carol Gilligan's approach, women are more concerned with
relationships, and men are more concerned with rights,· then the
way each approaches divorce, and, in particular the division of as
sets and child custody, is likely to be very different.
Given that, Ms. Nathanson's decision to restrict her divorce
practice to women is perfectly understandable; she should be
treated no differently than a lawyer who specializes in representing
tort plaintiffs, unions, or criminal defendants. The issue is not
whether she is, in fact, discriminating against men, but whether,
having decided to specialize in the issues of concern to women in
divorce cases, she would be either wasting her limited resources-in
a lawyer's case, the resource in most demand being time-or taking
on an issue, rather than a client, she was not fully prepared to rep
resent. Suppose, for example, a lawyer has built his or her practice
on the representation of plaintiffs in employment discrimination
cases, and that, as a result, the lawyer's clients have consisted of
women and people of color. Suppose also that a white male were to
approach the lawyer and ask for representation in what is some
times called a reverse discrimination case, that is, that the employer
was trying so hard to hire women or people of color that this person
did not get full and fair consideration for a position. If the lawyer
turns the case down, using as shorthand that he or she does not
represent white males in discrimination cases, what the lawyer
would really mean is that he or she does not represent that kind of
claim, rather than that kind of person.
Using a cultural feminist approach, it would appear that Ms.
Nathanson has built her practice on representing a certain kind of
claim in divorce cases, one that is different from the kinds of claims
men usually make, and that she is therefore justified in restricting
her practice, that it is no more discrimination than it would be to
restrict her practice to unions or employers, landlords or tenants,
criminal defendants or the state.

47.

Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.

em. L. REv. 1, 14 (1988).
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THE MCAD DECISION

Obviously, the MCAD did not agree with this analysis. In
stead, it held that a lawyer may not refuse to consider requests for
representation by persons within a protected class, although appar
ently a lawyer may ultimately refuse to represent a person if he or
she feels antipathy to the cause of that potential client, possibly
even if that means that the lawyer effectively refuses to represent
all people in a protected class after considering their cases. The
decision states:
This ruling does not impinge upon Nathanson's right to devote
her practice to furthering the cause of women as she defines that
cause. Had Nathanson concluded that the issues raised by Com
plainant's divorce action were not consistent with her specialty
and area of interest and rejected Complainant on that basis,
rather than solely because he is a man, the focus of this inquiry
would be different. However, Nathanson never inquired into the
nature or circumstances of Complainant's divorce case and stated
only that she did not represent men in divorce cases. 48

In other words, had Ms. Nathanson taken up both her time and
the Complainant's, interviewed him, and then informed him that
she did not feel she could represent him properly, the MCAD prob
ably would not have found in his favor. But because she had a pol
icy of representing only women in divorce cases, she was deemed to
be in violation of Massachusetts law. That result would certainly
seem to elevate form over substance.
Assuming, however,. that the MCAD actually meant what it
seems to be saying then it is unlawful discrimination for Ms. Na
thanson to restrict her divorce practice to women. The question,
then, should be whether Ms. Nathanson is entitled to restrict her
practice, or a portion of her practice, to people who have been his
torically oppressed, whether she announces that policy to potential
clients at the outset or screens them first before she turns them
down.
As discussed above, some feminist legal scholars are attracted
to the parity argument, and would be likely to agree with the
MCAD, assuming that other arguments regarding whether we
should indeed treat the lawyer/client relationship as a place of pub
lic accommodation are not persuasive. On the other hand, radical
48. Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 41 (MeAD Feb.
25, 1997).
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feminists would argue that women have been oppressed over the
years, indeed, that women have been particularly oppressed by the
economic effects of divorce,49 and that it is therefore perfectly ac
ceptable for a woman attorney to choose to devote her energies to
attempting to redress that imbalance by representing only women
in divorce cases. Finally, cultural feminists would presumably agree
with the argument regarding the effect of divorce on women. 50 In
addition, they would also be likely to see women's needs in the con
text of divorce cases as different, and therefore justifying a decision
to concentrate on representing those needs as opposed to others.
CONCLUSION

By applying a kind of formal equality, insisting that discrimina
tion against men is legally no different than discriminating against
women, the MCAD is, I believe, neither correctly following legal
precedent nor, normatively, showing any understanding of the dif
ference in the experiences of women, particularly in the context of
divorce. Although Ms. Nathanson distinguishes the kinds of clients
she chooses to represent by gender, at least in one part of her prac
tice, she does so, presumably, in order to engage in a particular
form of specialization, rather than because of gender-based animus.
That decision should be treated no differently than other choices to
specialize, to represent unions, criminal defendants, or civil rights
plaintiffs. The MCAD's conclusion to do otherwise is neither com
pelled by legal precedent, nor, I would argue, should it be com
pelled by feminist legal theory.

See WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 323.
See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
49.
50.

ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE

